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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT­
PRIVACY EXEMPTION-HOW Similar Is a "Similar File"?-Pacific 
Molasses Co. v. NLRB Regional Office No. 15, 577 F.2d 1172 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The need for making information contained in government 
files available to the publicI was the major force behind passage of 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by Congress in 1966. 2 In 
the past, government agencies3 had successfully avoided disclosure 
to the public of the significant amounts of information within their 
control. 4 Citizens denied access to this information had no opportu­
nity to scrutinize government decisions or to hold federal agencies 
accountable for their actions. Congress intended the FOIA to help 
end government abuse of its powers. 5 
1. See J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 1-5 (1978). Federal 
records are potentially a major source of information on a variety of subjects ranging 
from nuclear power to housing discrimination. The studies and information held by 
the government lose much of their usefulness when the public does not have access 
to them. 
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See J. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 1-1 to 4-12. 
3. An agency, for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) purposes, includes any 
federal or executive branch entity exercising the authority of the United States gov­
ernment. Independence of authority is the key criterion used to determine which in­
stitutions qualify as agencies. Private corporations, as well as state and local govern­
ments, are excluded from the provisions of the FOIA. The National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) is clearly an agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976). See also 
Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
4. Until the 1950's, agencies had full power to do as they wished with informa-
( 
tion, and they frequently kept their files to themselves. Through the Housekeeping 
Statutes, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), based on enactments in 1789, federal agency heads 
have traditionally had control over possession of files and were not inclined to dis­
close them to the public. See generally J. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 2-1-2-16. See 
also Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. 
GR.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1970) (discusses avoidance techniques agencies use to with­
hold information). 
5. A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and 
the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its in­
formation varies. A danger signal to our democratic society in the United 
States is the fact that such a political truisnl' needs repeating.... The needs 
of the electorate have outpaced the laws which gl!arantee public access to 
the facts in Government.... S. 1160 [The Freedom of Information Act] will 
correct this situation. It provides the necessary machinery to assure the 
availability of Government information necessary to an informed electorate. 
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1965), reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2418, 2429. 
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Despite the Act's emphasis on the public's right to know, Con­
gress also explicitly recognized the importance of withholding doc­
uments in certain circumstances. As part of the FOIA, Congress 
passed nine exemptions6 which specify instances in which consider­
ations other than public access take precedence. 7 One exemption, 
known as the privacy exemption, attempts to protect individual 
rights. This exemption acknowledges that a democratic government 
6. The FOrA includes the following exemptions: 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are­
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Execu­
tive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign pol­
icy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; 
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an 
agency; 
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 
552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be 
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the 
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to partic­
ular types of matters to be withheld; 
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from 
a person and privileged or confidential; 
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would 
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the 
agency; 
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but 
only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere 
with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial 
or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of per­
sonal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the 
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the 
course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful na­
tional security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished 
only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and 
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement 
personnel; 
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition re­
ports prepared by, on behalf of or for the use of an agency responsible for 
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or 
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, 
concerning wells. 
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any per­
son requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt 
under this subsection. 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
7. See Comment, The Freedom of Information Act: A Survey of Litigation Un­
der the Exemptions, 48 MISS. L.J. 784 (1977) (for a discussion of the ForA exemp­
tions). See also Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1977, 
1978 DUKE L. J. 189. 
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open to public scrutiny does not inherently require that there be 
public disclosure of personal details relating to individuals. The pri­
vacy exemption balances individual rights against public demands, 
permitting agencies to withhold "personnel and medical files and 
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. . . . "8 
In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB Re­
gional Office No. 159 confronted the appropriate application of the 
privacy exemption. In attempting to strike a balance between the 
FOIA's purpose of disclosure and the individual right to privacy, 
the court used a broad construction of the privacy exemption to 
withhold union authorization cards. 10 By such an interpretation of 
the exemption, the court limited the expressed policy of the FOIA. 
Early in 1977, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union 
began unionization efforts at the Pacific Molasses Company. Fol­
lowing standard procedures, the union obtained signatures of the 
Pacific Molasses employees on authorization cards. These cards 
serve as records indicating that a worker wants an opportunity to 
vote on whether a union election should be held. An election was 
held, however, the employees ultimately voted against a union. 
The Pacific Molasses Company demanded to review the cards with 
the intent of attacking the validity of the signatures and the accu­
racy of the dates,l1 and thereby challenge the validity of an elec­
tion. The Company's efforts to obtain the authorization cards were 
presumably intended to discourage future unionization attempts. 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which was hold­
ing the cards, refused to release them to the Company.12 Pacific 
Molasses brought suit under the FOIA in April 1977, in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to com­
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). 
9. 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978). 
10. Union authorization cards when signed by an employee constitute a show­
ing of interest by that employee to schedule a union election. ld. at 1177. The infor­
mation contained on a card includes the employee's name, address, telephone num­
ber, 'department, shift and job classification as well as the employer's name and 
location. ld. at 1175. The Third Circuit, in Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 
566 F.2d 214 (3d CiT. 1977), is the only other circuit to have heard the issue of the 
FOIA and union authorization cards. See Sobol, An Example ofJudicial Legislation: 
The Third Circuit's Expansion of Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act to 
Include Union Authorization Cards, 23 VILL. L. REV. 751 (1977-1978). 
11. 577 F.2d at 1176. 
12. ld. 
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pel the NLRB Regional Office to release the cards,13 claiming that 
they were government records which were subject to dfsclosure 
under the FOIA.14 The NLRB argued that the protection of the 
employees' privacy took precedence over the employer's desire to 
view the signatures. The district court ordered the NLRB to dis­
close the cards to the employer, holding that the information on 
the cards, which included each. employee's name, job classifica­
tion, and signature, was not sufficiently personal to warrant their 
exemption. 1s 
The NLRB appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed, 
13. Id. Although in this case, the union was not supported by the workers in 
the election, valid reasons exist for an employer desiring access to the cards. In the 
past, instances of fraud or misunderstanding by employees signing the cards have 
occurred so that an employer's refusal to trust the validity of the cards could be 
justified. Rather than allow the company to see the authorization cards, however, the 
remedy by the courts in such cases has been to deny the NLRB's order for the em­
ployer to bargain. See NLRB v. J.M. Mach. Corp., 410 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1969), in 
which the court found that the employer's refusal to bargain was not in bad faith 
where those employees signing the cards did not know that the purpose was solely to 
obtain an election. See also Schwarzenback-Huber Co. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 236 (2d 
Cir. 1969), cen. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969), in which misrepresentation to employ­
ees that signing the cards was simply to have an election, was grounds for invali­
dating those cards, when in fact, a signature meant an intent to join the union. 
Prior to the passage of the FOIA, at least one case held that the employer was 
not allowed to see authorization cards based on the secrecy of union elections pro­
vided for by statute. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1973). See NLRB v. New Era Die Co., 118 
F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1941). See also 29 C.F.R. § 102.117 (1979); C. MORRIs, THE DE­
VELOPING LABOR LAW 156 (1971); Note, The Right to Disclosure of NLRB Docu­
ments Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119 (1976). 
The NLRB has attempted to avoid disclosure under exemptions other than the 
privacy exemption. The exemptions most frequently used include exemption 5, per­
taining to inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters, and exemption 7, re­
garding investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(5), (7) (1976). The courts have shown confusion in these areas equal to that of 
the privacy exemption. See NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., 78 Lab. Cas. 20,781 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (cards exempt under exemption 7); cf, Donn Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 
229 N.L.R.B. 116 (cards not exempt under either exemption 5 or 7); Gerico, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713 (D. Colo. 1976) (cards exempt under exemption 7A during 
pendency of unfair labor practice proceeding, but not after). See also Wiegmann, The 
Scope of FOIA Exemptions, 1977 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 1. 
14. Questions have arisen as to what information falls under the jurisdiction of 
the FOIA, what constitutes a "record", and what constitutes "in the possession" of 
an agency. See Comment, What is a Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom of In­
formation Act's Threshold Requirement, 1978 B.Y.L. REV. 408; Note, Applying the 
FOIA in the Area of Federal Grant Law: Exploring An Unknown Entity, 27 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 294 (1978); Note, The Definition of Agency Records under the Freedom 
of Information Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1979). See also Soucie v. David, 448 
F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (a clear determination of what constitutes a record). 
15. 577 F .2d at 1176. 
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finding the cards exempt from disclosure under the FOIA privacy 
exemption. The majority held that an individual's decision about 
whether a union election should be scheduled is a matter of per­
sonal choice, and thereby concluded that disclosure of the authori­
zation cards would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy 
protected by the privacy exemption. 16 
Fifth Circuit Senior Judge Skelton dissented. 17 Judge Skelton 
discussed the problem that cases like Pacific Molasses create when 
the privacy exemption is given a broad interpretation. He con­
tended that the court's improper use of the test for determining 
disclosure has expanded the exemption to the extent that any inva­
sion of privacy, no matter how insubstantial, will result in 
nondisclosure by an agency. Consequently, the privacy exemption 
creates a loophole that facilitates government secrecy. Judge 
Skelton stated that the holding in Pacific Molasses is inconsistent 
with congressional intent of full disclosure of information held by 
the government. IS This note analyzes Pacific Molasses and the con­
flicting standards used in construing the privacy exemption. An ex­
amination of the legislative history reveals the competing purposes 
of the FOIA and its privacy exemption. 
II. AVAILABILITY OF AGENCY INFORMATION 
The philosophy behind the FOIA is rooted in the Administra­
tive Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. 19 The APA was Congress' first 
16. See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977), 
which describes more thoroughly the personal nature used to exempt authorization 
cards. 
17. 577 F.2d at 1184. 
18. Id. at 1188. 
19. Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act is as follows: 
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United 
States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating 
solely to the internal management of an agency­
(a) RULES.-Every agency shall separately state and currently publish in 
the Federal Register (1) descriptions of its central and field organization 
including delegations by the agency of final authority and the established 
places at which, and methods whereby, the public may secure information 
or make submittals or requests; (2) statements of the general course and 
method by which its functions are .channeled and determined, including the 
nature and requirements of all formal or info~mal· procedures available as 
well as forms and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers, re­
ports, or examinations; and (3) substantive rules adopted as authorized by 
law and statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and 
adopted by the agency for the guidance of the public, but not rules ad­
dressed to and served upon named persons in accordance with law. No per­
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attempt to rectify government secrecy. This legislation was aimed 
at all federal agencies, and specifically at those, such as the Veter­
an's Administration and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, which 
were accumulating large amounts of information about individuals, 
yet denying the public access to that material. 20 
The AP A generally was unsuccessful in accomplishing its pur­
pose. Government agencies commonly avoided disclosing informa­
tion under the APA because of two primary interpretational diffi­
culties in the Act's provisions. The first difficulty under the APA 
centered on the provision which allowed an exemption to disclo­
sure "for good cause. "21 The absence of standards defining the 
term "good cause" allowed agencies to interpret it to their benefit. 
Consequently, whenever agency personnel felt there was a suffi­
cient reason to withhold information, the material was kept confi­
dential. 22 The second loophole involved the APA's provision 
granting standing to sue for information only to those persons "di­
rectly and properly concerned" with obtaining such information. 23 
The legislative history contains no definition of "directly and prop­
erly concerned." By alleging that the requester had no inherent 
right to the material, agencies had further leeway to prevent dis-
son shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure 
not so published. 
(b) OPINIONS AND ORDERS.-Every agency shall publish or, in accord­
ance with published rule, make available to public inspection all final opin­
ions or orders in the adjudication of cases (except those requried for good 
cause to be held confide~tial and not cited as precedents) and all rules. 
(c) PUBLIC RECORDS.-Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of 
official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to 
persons properly and directly concerned except information held confiden­
tial for good cause found. 
5 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a)-(c) (1976). 
20. See generally J. O'REILLY, supra note 1; Note, Freedom of Information and 
the Individual's Right to Privacy: Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 14 CALIF. 
W. L. REV. 183 (1978); Note, Comments on Pr.oposed Amendments to Section 3 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 417 (1965). 
21. 5 U.S.C. § l002(c) (1976). 
22. The statutory requirement that information about routine administrative 
actions need be given only to "persons properly and directly concerned" has 
been relied upon almost daily to withhold Government information from the 
public.... If none of the other restrictive phrases of 5 U.S.C. 1002 [The 
Administrative Procedure Act] applies to the official Government record 
which an agency wishes to keep confidential, it can be hidden behind the 
"good cause found" shield. 
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS at 2423. 
23. Id. at 6, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2423. 
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closure. 24 Thus, the wide discretion arising under the APA in 
many cases precluded the public from obtaining agency infonna­
tion. 
Realizing that too much information was being withheld with­
out an actual basis,25 Congress again decided to attack the prob­
lem. In 1965, it drafted the FOIA,26 which dealt with and modified 
the two areas of the APA that had proven troublesome. This newer 
statute was clearly designed to emphasize disclosure. The APA's 
"good cause" standard was replaced by specific exemptions to dis­
closure which were intended to reduce government abuse by limit­
ing the criteria upon which information could be withheld. 27 The 
"directly and properly concerned" test was also rejected in favor of 
a standard that allowed disclosure to "any person,"28 thereby 
alleviating court scrutiny of any person requesting infonnation. The 
"any person" standard of the FOIA aids in opening agency files to 
the public. 29 The FOIA has simplified the procedure by which the 
public can gain access to government files. The FOIA has not, 
24. "[T]here is no remedy available to a citizen who has been wrongfully 
denied access to the Government's public records." ld. at 5, reprinted in [1966] 2 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2422. 
25. "Withholding instances mC!unted, and stirred the concern that the APA § 3 
qualifications had made that public information law into a large loophole for agency 
secrecy." See J. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 2-4. 
26. For the legislative history on the need for the FOIA, see H.R. REP., supra 
note 5, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2418. 
It is vital to our way of life to reach a workable balance between the right of 
the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information in 
confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate se­
crecy. The right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government 
is operating can be just as important to him as his right to privacy and his 
right to confide in his Government. This bill strikes a balance considering 
all these interests. 
ld. at 6, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2423. 
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
28. (3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records 
which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance 
with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to 
be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person. 
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). 
29. In addition to attempting to solve the APA problems, other FOIA require­
ments include that each agency publish its rules and methods oforganization and opera­
tion in the Federal Register, and give to any person access to agency policies, opin­
ions, orders and administrative manuals. Materials not in the Federal Register must 
be indexed so that they can be found by laypersons. These other requirements of the 
FOIA strive to assure openness of agency policies and attempt to foster familiarity 
with agency procedure on the part of laypersons. See id. § 552(a)(I),(2). 
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however, eliminated the substantive problems in determining what 
information should be available for public scrutiny. 
III. THE NEED FOR PRIVACY 
The FOIA's goal of total disclosure was necessarily thwarted 
by Congress' awareness that not all information should be dis­
closed. The nine statutory exemptions to disclosure30 provide that 
certain records specified in the Act can legitimately be withheld 
from the public because of the importance of other interests which 
outweigh public desire for the information. 
The personal privacy exemption is based on a long-standing, 
yet not clearly articulated, philosophy that people have an inher­
ent right to be let alone. 31 By providing for nondisclosure of "per­
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy 
... ,"32 the privacy exemption emphasizes the rights of individuals 
to have information about their personal lives, health, and past his­
tory remain confidential. 33 
30. Id. § 552(b). 
31. Although no specific constitutional amendment designates the right to pri­
vacy, this right is found in various areas of the law. See Glancy, The Invention of the 
Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979); Vache & Makibe, Privacy in Govern­
ment Records: Philosophical Perspectives and Proposals for Legislation, 14 GONZ. L. 
REV. 515 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has extended constitutional rec­
ognition of the right to privacy as a penumbra of the Bill of Rights. See Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Passage of the 
Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), is further evidence of renewed public 
awareness of government invasion into our lives. This Act regulates conditions of 
disclosure of records regarding individuals. I d. 
The right to be "let alone" is also a basic concept behind the creation of the in­
vasion of privacy tort cause of action. See Sternal, Informational Privacy and Public 
Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977). See also Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human 
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Project, Govern­
ment Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1282-1303 
(1975). For information on the NLRB and privacy, see Irving & DeDeo, The Right to 
Privacy and the Freedom in Information: The NLRB and Issues Under the Privacy 
Act am) the Freedom of Information Act, 29 N.Y.V. CONF. LAB. 49, 81 (1976). 
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
33. The legislative history names the Veteran's Administration, HEW, and the 
Selective Service as agencies whose files should remain closed, but the list was not 
meant to be all-inclusive. Because the history is so brief, however, it has not pro­
vided an adequate background on which courts can base their determinations. The 
legislative history notes as follows: 
Personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy: Such 
agencies as the Veterans' Administration, Department of Health, Education, 
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The privacy exemption contains a technical procedure, a two­
pronged test, for determining whether a file qualifies for non­
disclosure. The test is derived directly from the wording of the ex­
emption. 34 Under the first step, a threshold determination is made 
as to whether a file is personnel, medical, or similar to those types 
of files. Under the second step, a balance is struck between disclo­
sure of personnel, medical, or similar types of files and the serious­
ness of the invasion of privacy that disclosure would cause. There­
fore, even if a file contains personnel, medical, or similar types of 
information, disclosure is not to be withheld solely because of the 
nature of the file. Rather, it is legally mandated that the informa­
tion be kept private only if disclosure would violate the second 
prong of the test by "constitut[ing] a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy." 
The first two specifications in the exemption, which preclude 
disclosure of personnel or medical files, are self-explanatory. 35 
Such files clearly have privacy values attached. Legislative history 
cites these categories as particularly deserving of protection from 
public knowledge. 36 
and Welfare, Selective Service, and Bureau of Prisons have great quantities 
of files containing intimate details about millions of citizens. Confidentiality 
of these records has been maintained by agency regulation but without stat­
utory authority. A general exemption for the category of information is much 
more practical than separate statutes protecting each type of personal record. 
The limitation of a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" pro­
vides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of pri­
vacy and the preservation of the public's right to Government information 
by excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the in­
dividual. The exemption is also intended to cover detailed Government re­
cords on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual 
and not the facts concerning the award of a pension or benefit or the compi­
lation of unidentified statistical information from personal records. 
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 11, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS at 2428 (footnote omitted). 
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
35. One problem with the definition of personnel and medical files is whether 
the phrase "a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" modifies them. One 
view specifies that any file that is clearly personnel or medical is exempt. Depart­
ment of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,387 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A second 
view is that neither personnel nor medical files are automatically exempt unless dis­
closure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Id. at 
373 (Brennan, J.). 
36. At the same time that a broad philosophy of "freedom of information" is en­
acted into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy 
with respect to certain information in Government files, such as medical and person­
nel records." S. REP. No. 813, 89th CONG., 2d Sess., 3 (1966). 
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The exemption for "similar files," however, is not adequately 
defined in the FOIA and its interpretation has proved to be trou­
blesome. Apparently, the term was used by the drafters of the 
FOIA as a catch-all provision to prevent disclosure of information 
which is not technically personnel or medical but analogous in na­
ture, thus warranting protection from public eyes. The use of this 
broad term "similar" by the drafters eliminated the need to decide 
application to each of an exhaustive list of files in the possession of 
the federal government. 37 Unfortunately, although the term 
simplified matters for the legislature, the inherent problems in its 
interpretation have confused the courts. 38 The legislative history of 
the privacy exemption has not provided an adequate background 
for determining which agency inf~rmation qualifies as "similar." 
Consequently, holdings of cases involving "similar files" are incon­
sistent. 
IV. INTERPRETATION OF "SIMILAR FILES" BY THE COURTS 
The amgiguity of the nine exemptions to the FOIA has been 
criticized for 'causing confusion in both agencies and the courts. 39 
In the instance of the privacy exemption, the lack of clear 
37. Id. 
38. As well as the interpretative confusion over "similar" files, courts have split 
on the weight to be given to the second prong balancing test of a "clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." An agency, or court, after having decided 
that a file is similar, personnel, or medical, should then determine whether disclo­
sure of such file would constitute an invasion of privacy clearly unwarranted by the 
FOIA. This balancing test is used to analyze the conflicting interest. Circuits, how­
ever, have varied on the interests to be weighed. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (privacy interests on the individual should be balanced against the 
purpose to be served by the party requesting disclosure); cf. Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 
F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (unclear whether balance should be in the context of 
unrestricted disclosure to the public or use-specified release to the requestors); 
Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973) (interests of the individual should be 
balanced against the general public interest in disclosure). 
The use of the term "clearly" in the second prong has also caused confusion. 
Courts have failed to note the strong mandate toward disclosure set forth by use of 
the term. The fact that some agencies strongly disapproved of its insertion into the 
privacy exemption is convincing that "clearly" serves to limit the amount of informa­
tion that can be statutorily exempt. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 
U.S. 352, 378 n.16 (1976). Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976), requires a 
less strict standard of disclosure, due solely to the absence of the word "clearly." 
39. See Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D. D.C. 
1973), modified, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); 
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967); 
Emerson, The Danger of State Secrecy, 218 NATION 395,398 (1974); Wade, Freedom 
of Information-Officials Thwart Public Right to Know, 175 SCIENCE 498 (1972). 
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standards results in unpredictability of court decisions. 4o Courts 
taking a broad interpretation of "similar files" emphasize the im­
portance of privacy over disclosure. 41 Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. 
IRS42 exemplifies this view. There, the Third Circuit implied that 
information does not have to be closely related to personnel or 
medical files to be exempt under the privacy exemption. The file 
in question in Wine Hobby consisted simply of names and ad­
dresses of persons required to register with the United States Bu­
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. 43 The court was satisfied 
that the names and addresses were sufficiently personal to warrant 
protection from disclosure under the privacy exemption. The Third 
Circuit judges thus believed that the term "similar" was not in­
tended to permit the release of files where common sense would 
dictate that they be exempt. 44 
In the Fourth Circuit, in contrast, the test for "similar files" 
has been narrowly construed, tilting the balance toward public dis­
closure to facilitate the apparent intent of the FOIA.45 In Robles v. 
EPA,46 the Fourth Circuit held that "similar files" must contain 
40. J. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 1-4. The author predicts that case law will re­
main inconsistent because of the different facts of each case, the varying agencies' at­
titudes and the lack of weight which each circuit gives to the opinion of the other 
circuits.Id. 
41. Since the thrust of the exemption is to avoid unwarranted invasions of pri­
vacy, the term "files" should not be given an interpretation that would often pre­
clude inquiry into this more crucial question. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 
F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1974). 
42. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974). 
43. Under federal regulations, anyone making wine solely for family use is ex­
empt from taxation. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d at 134. Registration with 
the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is required. The plain­
tiff, a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the manufacturing and sale of home 
wine-making kits, sought disclosure of all registrants with the Bureau. The regis­
trants numbered several thousand. The corporation, Wine Hobby USA, Inc., wanted 
the names to conduct an advertising campaign. Id. 
44. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. 
45. See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977); New 
England Medical Center v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1976); Title Guar. Co. v. 
NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), cen. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Metropolitan 
Life Ins. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 166 (D.D.C. 1976); Waples, The Freedom of In­
formation Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974). 
46. 484 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The EPA in 1970 studied radiation levels in 
homes and buildings where such uranium had been used. Uranium tailings, a by­
product of uranium processing, were commonly used as clean fill dirt in commun­
ities. The agency denied the plaintiff the results, offering all but the names and ad­
dresses of homeowners. 
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" 'intimate details' of a 'highly personal' nature"47 to qualify under 
the privacy exemption. The court reached this conclusion by find­
ing that the basis for the personnel file exemption was the inclu­
sion of personal details. By analogy, the court concluded that "sim­
ilar files" should contain similar information. 48 The Robles court, in 
contrast to Wine Hobby, based its narrow interpretation of "similar 
files" on a leading FOIA case, Getman v. NLRB. 49 Getman, like 
Wine Hobby, involved the disclosure of names and addresses. The 
names and addresses were of employees involved in union efforts. 
The requesters were law professors working on a publication re­
garding workers and unions. The opinion of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Getman 
differs from that of the Third Circuit in that it did allow the names 
and addresses of the workers to be turned over to the requesters. 
The Getman court found that the intent of the FOIA was best 
served by allowing exemption only for files which are unquestiona­
bly private in nature. 50 
Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture51 is an 
example of information clearly containing the narrow "intimate de­
tails" required in the Robles test. The document in question was a 
housing report made in a study conducted by the Department of 
Agriculture. 52 The court of appeals found this report to be a similar 
file because it contained "information regarding marital status, le­
47. [d. at 845; cf. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d at 133 (standards 
used for determining a similar file are less strict). 
48. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp. 736 (D. Md. 
1978). In that case, an Employer Information Report form filed by Nationwide Insur­
ance with the Social Security Administration was disclosed to the American Jewish 
Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. [d. at 738. The insur­
ance company sought to have the information withheld, yet the court, emphasizing 
the strong intent toward disclosure, construed the exemptions narrowly. [d. at 740. 
49. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Getman allowed disclosure of names and ad­
dresses of certain employees to law professors who were engaged in a study of union 
election procedures. 
50. Both the House and Senate reports on the bill which became the 
Freedom of Information Act indicate that the real thrust of Exemption (6) is 
to guard against unnecessary disclosure of files of such agencies as the Vet­
erans Administration or the Welfare Department or Selective Service or Bu­
reau of Prisons, which would contain "intimate details" of a "highly personal" 
nature. [d. at 675 (footnotes oll1itted). 
51. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
52. The study stemmed from allegations by the Rural Housing Alliance that 
discrimination existed in the dissemination of loans. [d. at 75. The District of Colum­
bia Circuit found that the study was a "similar" file and remanded for a determina­
tion of whether disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per­
sonal privacy. [d. at 76. 
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gitimacy of children, identity of fathers of children, medical condi­
tion, welfare payments, alcoholic consumption, family fights, [and] 
reputation. . . . "53 Anyone gaining access to this report clearly 
would have personal details of the participants' style of living and 
could use this information to the disadvantage of the individual 
respondent, who at the time of taking part in the study would 
have been unaware that such information would be made public. 
Because of the many personal details of this report, the court of ap­
peals reasoned that such intimacy should not be public informa­
tion. 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the term 
"similar" in only one privacy exemption case, Department of the 
Air Force v. Rose. 54 Although the opinion has not greatly aided the 
circuits in their need for a uniform approach, Justice Brennan, 
writing for the majority, persuasively cites legislative history to 
support a narrow construction of the term. The information sought 
was case summaries of students of the United States Air Force 
Academy which were kept in the Honor and Ethics Code files. The 
summaries were usually developed when a student was accused of 
a violation of the Honor Code, a potentially damaging situation. 
Brennan noted that the files are not actually personnel files but are 
in fact similar files. 55 The files were termed "similar" because the 
material contained in them consisted of personal details and be­
cause privacy values attached to the reports made on the students' 
conduct. Even with the finding that the similar files were private 
in nature, however, the Supreme Court held that in light of the 
broad intent toward disclosure of government information, the in­
dividual student in question would not be unduly harmed by pub­
lic knowledge of the material in his file. Thus, even where a file is 
termed "similar," nondisclosure is not inevitable. The second 
prong, the determination of whether disclosure would clearly in­
vade privacy, can be decisive. 
The Third Circuit in Wine Hobby and the Fourth Circuit in 
Robles demonstrate a conflict, which the Fifth Circuit accentuates. 
53. 498 F.2d at 77. 
54. 425 U.S. 352 (1976). 
55. Another issue in the privacy exemption, not definitively answered, is 
whether the phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" modifies the 
terms "personnel" and "medical" as well as the term "similar." Id. Justice Brennan 
holds that all three categories are modified by the phrase. Id. at 373. But cf. id. at 
387 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the restrictive phrase applies only to "similar"; the 
exemption for personnel and medical files is clear and unembellished). 
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The issue in this conflict is whether common sense or leglSlal1Vv 
mandate should be followed in deciding a privacy case. The Third 
Circuit in Wine Hobby chose a result-oriented approach. The 
Fourth Circuit in Robles, on the other hand, set a standard based 
on the legislative mandate of the FOIA. Ideally, Congress incorpo­
rates both common sense and public sentiment into legislation. In 
privacy exemption cases, it is difficult to fulfill the goal of inter­
preting the meaning of "similar files" while balancing the need to 
protect certain privacy rights. Pacific Molasses is evidence of the 
tension that is created by these two aims. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The document in Pacific Molasses does not on its face contain 
personal details similar to those in Rural Housing Alliance. 56 The 
Pacific Molasses court notes at the outset of its opinion that the 
proper formula for determining whether the privacy exemption 
should apply to a document consists of first deciding if the cards 
fall into the category of personnel, medical, or similar files. The 
second inquiry is whether disclosure of cards would be an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 57 The court, in contra­
vention to this formula, determined that the union authorization 
cards should not be accessible to the requester. While it discusses 
the two-pronged test, it fails to adhere to it in its actual determina­
tion of whether the cards should be disclosed. 58 Instead of finding 
the cards to be similar based on the amount and type of informa­
tion they contain, the court exempts them because it contends that 
their disclosure would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of the em­
ployees' privacy. 59 The court, in effect, uses the second prong to 
determine the applicability of the first prong of the test. The Fifth 
Circuit notes in its opinion that it feels, as does the Third Circuit, 
that the emphasis should be placed on whether disclosure will re­
sult in a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, rather than al­
lowing the classification given to the material as personnel, med­
ical, or similar to prevent application of the exemption. 
The court relies on case law to support its decision. One of the 
factors relied on is the "personal nature" criteria set out in Rose. 6o 
56. 498 F.2d at 73. See also text accompanying notes 51-53 supra. 
57. 577 F.2d at 1178. 
58. See id. at 1180-81 n.5. The court here openly rejects the "intimate details" 
test used in Robles. Id. See also, notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. 
59. 577 F.2d at 1182. The judges base their feelings on the chilling effect lan­
guage which permeates the NLRA. See text accompanying note 69 infra. 
60. 425 U.S. at 352. 
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This reliance is misplaced because Rose is distinguishable from Pa­
cific Molasses. The files in Rose contain detailed information about 
an indivudual and his past. Presumably, summaries of cadets' al­
leged wrongdoing contain information having a great potential to 
inflict harm upon the individual if such knowledge becomes public. 
Pacific Molasses concerns only the limited job information listed on 
an authorization card. In Rose, the Supreme Court declined to 
withhold the cadets' files, even though there was a clear potential 
for harm. Such harm is not as clear in Pacific Molasses, yet the 
court chose to exempt the cards from disclosure. 
Pacific Molasses also relies on the holding of Wine Hobby 
which held that the term "files" should be construed broadly to in­
clude any information that a court feels would violate privacy 
rights. 61 This view conflicts with the thrust of the FOIA that there 
be disclosure, and it reflects the Third Circuit's bias toward privacy 
rights. The Wine Hobby rationale contributes to the logic used by 
the Pacific Molasses court in its expansive use of the exemption. 
Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB,62 which closely re­
sembles the facts and holding of Pacific Molasses, provides the 
third criteria which the Fifth Circuit followed. In Masonic Homes, 
the Third Circuit found that union authorization cards contain a 
"thumbnail sketch"63 of an employee's job classification and status. 
From -this analysis, it reasons that the files are similar. Pacific Mo­
lasses cited Masonic Homes with little of its own analysis as to why 
such information should be considered "similar." 
Disclosure of an employee's job classification and status is not 
necessarily a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Although an 
individual employee's request to schedule a union election is a per­
sonal decision with which the Fifth Circuit sympathized and 
wanted to protect,64 the privacy exemption should not be applied 
for such arbitrary reasons. The "thumbnail sketch" of one's current 
employment is not persuasive for application of the standards ~f 
the privacy exemption, because the card, with the "sketch" it con­
61. 502 F.2d at 133. 
62. 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977); accord, United Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 
449 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Contra, Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 444 F. 
Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (union authorization cards not exempt under the pri­
vacy exemption). See Sobol, supra note 10. 
63. 556 F.2d at 220. 
64. See Davis, supra note 39, at 762. "[O]ne recurring problem is what to do 
when no exemption specifically authorizes non-disclosure but when common sense 
obviously requires it." Id. 
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tains, 'is not similar to a personnel file. 65 An authorization card con­
taining an employee's name, address, employer, and job classifica­
tion has little of the data that a similar file should contain. As 
Judge Skelton notes, a file similar to a personnel file should contain 
"vast amounts of personal data . . . showing, for example, where 
. ' .. [the individual] was bom,the names of his parents, where he 
had lived from time to time, his high school or other school record, 
results of examinations, . [and] evaluations of his work perform­
ance. 66 The authorization card certainly is not of the detailed na­
ture of the study found, for example, in either Rural Housing or 
Rose.67 
In the split between FOIA and the National Labor Rela­
tions Act (NLRA)68 policy, the Fifth Circuit clearly falls on the side 
of labor rather than the FOIA. First, the judges invoke the "chilling 
effect"69 doctrine as evidence of the need for protection of the 
cards. They speculate that disclosure would effectively foreclose 
use of the cards because employees would be afraid to sign them. 
Consequently, the employees' right to organize as set forth in sec­
tion 7 of the NLRA would be impeded. 70 The court analogizes dis­
closure of the cards to the posting of a sign in the workplace say­
ing: "Sign up for the union here."71 Just as few workers would join 
under the watchful eyes of the employer, the court believes most 
workers would decline to sign a card that they thought would be 
viewed by the employer. Second, the court notes that the general 
secrecy of union proceedings, and specifically of union elections, is 
a characteristic of labor organizing that should be maintained. 
While the actual ballots used in an election are confidential by stat­
ute,72 the judges maintained that the secrecy of ballots should be 
extended to authorization cards. This perspective is drawn more 
from a desire to foster the right to unionize rather than from a 
knowledge of the intent of the FOIA. 
The judges fail to note that, although the secrecy of ballots is 
65. See note 13 supra for a discussion of the treatment of authorization cards un­
der other exemptions to the FOIA. 
66, 577 F.2d at 1185 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 
377). 
67. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra. 
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). 
69. See 577 F.2d at 1181. 
70. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
71. 577 F.2d at 1181 (quoting Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 
F.2d at 221). 
72. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(I) (1976). 
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authorized by statute,73 the confidentiality of union authorization 
cards is not specified by the NLRA. Without the statutory authori­
zation of privacy for the cards, the act of the judges in protecting 
the cards constitutes judicial legislation. An amendment to the 
NLRA by Congress specifically mandating secrecy of authorization 
cards would solve the problem. The cards then could be exempt 
under exemption three of the FOIA, which exempts from public 
access matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute 
. . . provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be 
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discre­
tion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for with­
holding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld 
. . . . "74 Under exemption three of the FOIA, a statute calling for 
withholding of information takes precedence over the policy of the 
FOIA.75 Thus, if authorization cards were protected by statute, the 
issue faced by the Fifth Circuit would be moot. 
In Pacific Molasses, the judicial interpretation of "similar files" 
has protected the authorization cards without resort to congres­
sional action. Yet, the purpose of the two-pronged test is to allow 
for the disclosure of as much material as possible. This purpose is 
defeated by the treatment Pacific Molasses gives the exemption in 
its manipulation of the clearly unwarranted invasion standard in a 
manner that precludes a strict determination of the classification of 
a file. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Pacific Molasses, the Fifth Circuit interprets the privacy ex­
emption of the FOIA. The privacy exemption76 is designed to al­
low nondisclosure only of information private in nature, that is, in­
formation which is a "personnel [or] ... medical [or] ... similar 
[file] . . . the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. "77 The court terms union 
authorization cards as "similar files" and holds that they are not 
subject to disclosure. In its determination that the cards are ex­
empt, the court twists the test that the privacy exemption estab­
73. Id. 
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). 
75. See Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information 
Act-1978, 1979 DUKE L.J. 327, 332-45 (discussing the use of the withholding stat­
ute exemption). 
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
77. Id. § 552(b)(6). 
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lishes. By its holding, the court verges on allowing any invasion of 
privacy to trigger application of the exemption. 78 This weakens the 
goal of the FOIA, which was to allow full disclosure to the public. 
Also, it permits a possible return to pre-FOIA days when agencies 
were able to avoid giving information to the public. 
The pull between common sense and a literal application of 
the privacy exemption creates a ten~ion for judges and agencies 
which ultimately forces the courts to twist the wording of the ex­
emption in an attempt .to reach a practical solution. Congressional 
review is clearly preferable to the continued confusion over, and 
redefinition of, the privacy exemption, which causes courts to cre­
ate their own standards. 79 The courts, the administrative agencies, 
and the citizens for whom the FOIA was drafted will benefit from 
reevaluation of the balance between privacy and the public's access 
to government documents. 
Barbara A . Joseph 
78. "Under this holding any invasion of personal privacy would result in non­
disclosure regardless of whether the material was a personnel, medical or similar 
file." 577 F.2d at U88. See Note, Disclosure of Union Authorization Cards Under the 
Freedom of Information Act-Interpreting the Personal Privacy Exemptions, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 949 (1978) (stating that the broad interpretation set forth in Wine 
Hobby and followed by Rose and Masonic Homes impliedly does away with the clas­
sification of personnel, medical, or similar files). 
79. Various possibilities for revamping the privacy exemption have been sug­
gested and subsequently criticized. See Koch, The Freedom of Information Act; Sug­
gestions for Making Information Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REV. 189, 220 
(1972) (no interference by the judiciary); Project, supra note 31, at 1085 (amendment 
of the balancing test to strike out the "clearly unwarranted invasion" test, protecting 
even minor invasions of privacy); Note, Freedom of Information and the Individu­
al's Right to Privacy; Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 183, 
203 (alleviation of the balancing test); Note, supra note 78 (congressional guidelines 
needed to limit the broad interpretation given by cases such as Pacific Molasses, and 
the amendment of the NLRA to specifically prohibit disclosure of the authorization 
cards). 
